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In this article author contrasts possibilism (the view that art is about the 
logically possible and that it cannot be about the impossible) with impos-
sibilism (the view that art can be and sometimes is about the logically 
impossible as well). Author argues in favor of possibilism. The main 
insight is that since impossible objects are necessarily non-existent art 
cannot be about them, it has to be about something that can exist. Also, 
author formulates fi ve more detailed views about the issue. Further, 
author discusses related notions like imaginability and conceivability. 
Author holds that Hume’s insight that an object cannot be conceived as 
non-existent counts in favour of possibilism. Besides, author introduces 
the distinction between real and apparent content of the work of art, 
believing that this distinction can be relevant in the discussion between 
possibilism and impossibilism. In the rest of the article author analyzes 
several prima facie counterexamples to possibilism (Jean-Luc Picard, 
Anna Karenina, paradox of patricide, Escher’s graphics) and tries to 
explain them away.
Keywords: Art; object; content; representation; possibility; contra-
diction.
1. Aboutness
Works of art are typically and usually about something. In the case of 
a novel or a fi lm it seems perfectly right to ask What is it about? Her-
* It is questionable whether determinate article can be used when we talk about 
necessarily non-existent things, after all, things that cannot be individuated.
** This work has been fully supported by the University of Rijeka, research project 
Uniri-human-18–239. I wish to thank to colleagues and friends whose comments 
and suggestions made substantial contribution to this work (in chronological order): 
David Davies, Nikica Petković, Takashi Yagisawa, Aleksandar Mijatović, Graham 
Priest, Iris Vidmar, Branko Kukurin, Dajan Plačković, Karlo Mikić.
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man Melville’s Moby Dick is about a whale hunter who is obsessed with 
a huge white whale. Martin Scorsese’s Taxi Driver is about a young 
lonely veteran who decides to fi ght the fi lth of the big city. Film can be 
about the corrupt policeman or about the middle age crisis. They have 
their subject matter. They are intentional. Paintings and sculptures are 
also usually about something. Michelangelo’s David depicts beauty and 
symmetry of a human body. Pablo Picasso’s Guernica shows horrors of 
an air raid. Even pieces of music can represent something, although 
typically they don’t. Bedrich Smetana’s Vltava shows how small moun-
tain brook grows into a big river. Miles Davis’ So What captures the 
sound of traffi c in a big city.
2. Art and the Possible
Sometimes works of art are about the actual things, people that really 
lived and events that really happened. Central characters of Tolstoy’s 
War and Peace were not fi ctional. Napoleon and Kutuzov really exist-
ed.1 Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment was inspired by an actually 
existing man. The town of Guernica was really bombed. Serpico existed 
and really fought corruption in the NYPD. However, works of art are 
usually about fi ctional characters and events. Characters from novels 
and fi lms typically never existed. But it does not matter whether they 
existed or not. They could have existed. There could have been police of-
fi cers like Kojak or Columbo, just as there could have been women like 
Emma Bovary or Anna Karenina. Even if they are not actual, they are 
possible. This was the view of Aristotle. Talking about the difference 
between the historian and the poet, he says:
It is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may 
happen—what  is possible according to the law of probability or necessity. 
The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. … The 
t rue difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may 
happen. (Aristotle, Poetics, Section I, Part IX)
The claim that art is about the possible might be misleading.2 Although 
fi ctional characters are possible, art tells us something about the actual 
world. Ultimately, it tells us something about ourselves. After all, this 
is why it is important. If we focus on the philosophical debate about the 
ontological status of the fi ctional characters (which is a very interesting 
question)3 we might forget why art really matters and why it is impor-
1 Though, Russian formalists, for instance, insisted on the difference between 
literary character and real person. No matter of the degree of similarity, the two 
should not be confl ated. Kutuzov from Tolstoy’s War and Peace is a fi ctional character 
while real Kutuzov is not.
2 For instance, it is not clear whether accepting this view commits us to the 
existence of possible objects. In my opinion, it does not. To say that x is possible is 
not to say that there exists possible object x. But this a matter of further debate.
3 Very good overview of different accounts of the ontological status of fi ctional 
characters can be found in the fi rst chapter of Thomasson’s Fiction and Metapysics 
from 1999.
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tant to us. One might even claim that fi ctional characters are noth-
ing but the means for saying something about the actual ones. John 
Slesinger’s Midnight Cowboy is about something that could happen to 
any young man coming from the countryside to the big city. Anna Kar-
enina is about something that could happen to any married woman. So, 
they are about the possible courses of events that might happen to the 
actual people. Shakespeare’s character Shylock from The Merchant of 
Venice obviously is a fi ctional character. But it is more than that. It is 
an incarnation of greed. And greed is an actual character trait of re-
ally existing people. Alienation felt by character Meursault in Camus’ 
The Stranger is felt by many actual people. Old man Santiago from 
Hemingway’s Old Man and the Sea is a fi ctional character but his will 
to prove himself is something that we all have. Serpico did really exist 
while Dirty Harry did not. Nevertheless, Dirty Harry is about the way 
in which many actual people would love to react. So, although the art 
is about the possible people and events, there is an important sense 
in which the art is about the actual. 4 Perhaps this is most important 
sense. When we talk about the work of art, a good answer to the ques-
tion What is it about? has to have several layers.
3. Art and the Impossible
I hope that these comments help clarify the sense in which art is about 
the possible, that is, the sense in which fi ctional characters and plots 
could have existed. However, it seems that art is not only about the 
possible. It seems that it can be about the impossible as well. Some 
works of art seem to be about the impossible courses of events. Some 
novels, fi lms, graphics, etc. prima facie represent objects and events 
that cannot exist. But how can that be? How could anything be about 
the impossible? How can anything be about the things that cannot 
exist?5 We watch such movies, we like them, we understand plots, we 
understand stories, we love heroes and hate bad guys, … However, if 
these plots are not possible, what are these movies really about?
4 Pierre Corneille’s Le Cid, performed in Paris in 1636, was criticized on grounds 
that it was unlikely that Chimene marry Rodrigue (Le Cid) who killed her father. In 
classicism probability (vraisemblance) was seen as requirement of poetics. Possibility 
was not suffi cient, characters had to be probable. This was the main issue in the 
Querelle du Cid—famous debate about the norms of literature.
5 Graham Priest wrote a short story about an empty box that contains something 
(Priest 1997). In the story he and his friend move furniture. The box fi rst was on the 
shelf, than they moved it to some other place, etc. In fact, there is nothing impossible 
in the story. The box is just an ordinary object, only its name is contradictory. In 
Dubravko Mataković’s cartoons one of the main characters is barren mother. Since 
she is the mother of the main character, she is obviously not barren. This oxymoron 
just adds to the overall absurdity of characters and plots, it is not constitutive 
for the plot. For this reason it would be wrong to say that these stories are about 
impossible objects. They are not about the impossible objects. Their authors do not 
describe something impossible. They only use oxymorons to increase the impression 
of absurdity or to prove a philosophical point.
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On the one hand, it seems obvious that art cannot be about the 
people and events that cannot exist, because in that case it would be 
about nothing. But, as we saw, art is not about nothing. Art is about 
something. It has some content. It has some object that it talks about. 
Therefore, art cannot be about the impossible. The impossible does not 
and cannot exist. If something purports to be about the impossible, it 
cannot be about anything at all.6
However, art quite often depicts states of affairs that are at least 
prima facie impossible. People cannot fl y but we read cartoons and 
watch movies about Superman, Batman, Spiderman, etc. Animals can-
not talk but we enjoy Aesop’s fables. Moreover, we believe that they 
have pedagogical and ethical value. We know that time-travel is not 
possible but it is not an obstacle for watching Terminator. We know 
that humans cannot become something else but we perfectly well un-
derstand episode from Odyssey when Circe turns Odysseus’ sailors into 
pigs, or the episode from the Bible when Lot’s wife is turned into a 
pillar of salt, or Kafka’s Metamorphosis where Gregor Samsa becomes 
a bug. We know that nothing can move faster than light but we have 
no problems understanding the idea of warp-drive in Star Trek, even 
the idea of transwarp. We know that there are no magic wands and no 
magic words, nevertheless Harry Potter is very popular. We have fun 
watching Body-swap movies or Adams Family. We read Gothic nov-
els. Borges, Marquez, and other writers from Latin America developed 
Magic realism. We know that we cannot walk in a circle always ascend-
ing or always descending and just because of that we admire Escher’s 
Ascending & Descending. Many things from Dali’s and Chagall’s paint-
ings cannot exist but we do not regard that as a failure.
One might object that I am doing two different things in this article: 
metaphysics of fi ction and philosophy of literary criticism. Discussion 
about the ontological status of fi ctional characters belongs to the meta-
physics of fi ction, while distinction between the apparent and real con-
tent belongs to the philosophy of literary criticism. These two things 
might be related but one should not blur the distinction and lump them 
together. However, it is completely natural that the two come together. 
They cannot be separated. The fi rst discussion directly and necessarily 
leads to the second one. We can reconstruct this path in four steps:
1) A has to be about something.
2) Apparently A is about X.
6 Can we make an exhibition of the impossible objects? No, because impossible 
objects do not exist and can not exist. There would simply be nothing to exhibit. 
The gallery hall would be empty. Of course, we can make exhibition with the title 
Perpetuum mobile and expose a number of drawings from the patent offi ce. But we 
could not expose Perpetuum mobile itself—a machine that produces energy without 
consuming it. The same holds for concepts like faster than light, time travel, round 
square, etc. The museum of impossible objects would be empty by necessity. Of course, 
museum of non-actual but possible objects would also be empty, but not necessarily. 
If actualized, these objects could be exhibited. On the other hand, impossible objects 
could not be exhibited under no circumstances because they could not be actualized.
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3) But A cannot be about X because X is not possible.
4) Therefore A has to be about something else.
If the apparent content is logically impossibile then piece of art has to 
be about something else and we have to interpret it. We have to fi nd out 
what is it really about. For this reason metaphysics of fi ction and inter-
pretation of fi ction naturally come together, they cannot and should not 
be separated. How can we correctly estimate the ontic commitment of a 
novel if we do not know what is novel really about? Although interpre-
tation in literature and in other branches of art can be very fi shy, gen-
eral principle seems obvious: no correct metaphysical analysis without 
correct interpretation! Also, no correct interpretation without correct 
metaphysical assumptions. How can we say what is novel really about 
if we are not aware of the relevant metaphysical and logical limitations?
Jan Alber asks ”how readers can make sense of” unnatural narra-
tives (Alber 2016: 3). I hope that this article may be of some help in 
answering that question.
4. The Nature of Possibility
It seems that we can explain away many of the above mentioned ex-
amples. There is a sense in which many of these cases are possible. Of 
course, the question is how restrictive or how permissive our criterion 
of possibility is. Criterion that is usual in philosophical discussions is 
very permissive, it is the criterion of logical possibility: whatever is not 
a contradiction is possible. As Hume said:
‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly 
conceives, includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that noth-
ing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a golden 
mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually 
exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore 
regard it as impossible. (Hume, Treatise, Book I, Part II, Section II)
The idea is simple, elements that can be combined without contradic-
tion give a possible state of affairs. Flying + man = fl ying man, fox + 
talking = talking fox, time + travel = time travel, horn + one = unicorn, 
etc. So, since there is no contradiction in the idea of a fl ying man, Su-
perman and Batman are possible. Since there is no contradiction in the 
idea of a magic wand, Circe and Harry Potter are possible. Although 
we have no slightest idea about the underlying causal mechanism, it 
is possible that words like Abracadabra or Expelliarmus have causal 
effects. Since radical skeptical scenarios are not contradictory, Matrix 
is possible. Since Cartesian insight that we are essentially thinking 
things and only accidentally have bodies is not a contradiction, Freaky 
Friday and other body swap movies are possible, etc.
Logical possibility is very permissive criterion.7 Here is well known 
passage from Plantinga:
7 Some accounts of possibility are much more restrictive. See, for instance, 
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility of D. M. Armstrong and Brian Skyrms 
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I think Socrates could have been an alligator; for I think he could have had 
an alligator body. At least he could have had an alligator body during part 
of his career. We have no diffi culty in understanding Kafka’s story about the 
man who wakes up one morning to discover that he has the body of a beetle; 
and in fact the state of affairs depicted there is entirely possible. In the 
same way it is possible that I should awaken one morning and discover (to 
my considerable chagrin) that my body had been exchanged for an alligator 
body. (Plantinga 1978: 65)
However, even if we accept so permissive criterion of possibility, this 
still does not mean that all the examples can be successfully explained 
away. It seems that some cases stubbornly resist: encounters of past 
and future selves, encounters of actual and possible selves,8 time travel 
paradoxes,9 temporal loops,10 teleportation,11 graphics of the impossible 
objects, nonexistent protagonists, incoherent stories, living deads, bar-
ren mothers, empty boxes that contain something, etc. These are cases 
that are at least prima facie logically impossible. This article is about 
such cases. The question is whether works of art can be about such 
cases. Can art be about the logically impossible? Or, talking in terms of 
possible worlds, the question is whether art can be about the logically 
impossible worlds.
In contemporary fertile and interesting discussion about the un-
natural narratives, all impossibilities are treated together, as a single 
phenomenon. Jan Alber in Unnatural Narrative from 2016 deals with 
“physically, logically, or humanly impossible scenarios and events that 
challenge our real-world knowledge” (Alber 2016: 3) However, in phi-
losophy there is a deeply entrenched distinction between factual pos-
sibility and logical possibility. Here factual possibility encompasses 
biological, technical, physical, and other kinds of possibilities that we 
know through experience. Logical possibility is conceptual possibility 
and we know it a priori. Personally, I am not very fond of this distinc-
tion, but there is a good reason for accepting it. Physically impossible 
objects are conceivable, while logically impossible objects are incon-
(Armstrong 1989) or Modal Realism of Mondadori and Morton (Mondadori and 
Morton 1976) not to be confused with Modal Realism of David Lewis.
8 David Lewis argues that travel between possible worlds is not possible. (Lewis, 
1986, 80) Saul Kripke says that there is no telescope for seeing different possible 
worlds (Kripke 1980: 44). Nevertheless, we enjoy movies where people encounter 
their possible selves.
9 Ted Sider points to the fact that Terminator 2 is incoherent (Sider 2009: 309). 
Nevertheless, we watch it. Though, Sider believes that time travel is not necessarily 
paradoxical.
10 D. H. Mellor argues that temporal loops are necessarily impossible because 
in that case events should cause themselves and that is inconsistent (Mellor 1998: 
132). His argument is strengthened with te fact that he relies on the causal theory of 
time. But if this is so, then the question is what is fi lm Groundhog Day really about.
11 Derek Parfi t argues that teleportation is not a process of travelling but rather 
process that annihilates the original person and creates a replica somewhere else 
(Parfi t 1984: 200).
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ceivable. This difference is of paramount importance, especially in the 
philosophical analysis of art. Even if the events and objects depicted in 
the works of art are factually impossible, they are conceivable! We can 
conceive of fl ying men and talking animals, and in such cases we un-
derstand what is the work of art about. On the other hand, we cannot 
conceive logically impossible situations. If the piece of art is declared to 
be about round square or wooden iron, we cannot know what it is about 
because we cannot conceive of such objects.
5. Imaginability and Existence
There is another characteristic of imaginability and conceivability 
which is relevant in this context. We cannot imagine an object as non-
existent. If we imagine it at all, we imagine it as existent. Although we 
know that fi ctional characters do not exist, we cannot think of them as 
nonexistent, we have to think of them as existent.
The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we con-
ceive to be existent. To refl ect on any thing simply, and to refl ect on it as 
existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoin’d 
with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, 
we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; 
and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form. (Hume, Treatise, Book 
I, Part II, Section VI)
This characteristic of imagined objects counts in favor of the view that 
art is and can be only about the logically possible. Since impossible ob-
jects are necessarily nonexistent, we cannot imagine them as existent. 
And, if we cannot imagine them as existent, we cannot imagine them 
at all. Since imagination is constitutive for the art, art cannot be about 
the logically impossible.
Of course, nonexistent objects and people are too tempting theme 
to be missed. Italo Calvino wrote a novel The Nonexistent Knight. It 
is about Agilulf—the knight who does not exist. The point of the novel 
is that he is so virtuous and so perfect that he cannot exist. How can 
we conceive that? Well, there is an empty armor that talks, and that 
is him. In fact, Agilulf has some characteristics of the existent people 
and some characteristics of the nonexistent ones. This is how we can 
follow the story. Due to this fact, Calvino’s Agilulf does not really vio-
late Hume’s insight that to imagine is to imagine as existent. After 
all, the novel is an allegory and the ontological pressure is not really 
hard. In the fantastic literature standards of possibility are more lib-
eral. One might plausibly argue that the real content of the novel is not 
the nonexistent knight Agilulf but rather ideal stereotype of knight or 
something else.
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6. Dilemma and Options
On the one hand, it seems that nothing can be about the logically im-
possible. While, on the other hand, it seems that art can be about any-
thing, including logically impossible. So, the question is whether art 
can or cannot be about the logically impossible. In principle there are 
two main options here—positive and negative answer to the question. 
Call them possibilism and impossibilism.12
 Possibilism is the view that art is and has to be about the logi-
cally possible, it is not and it cannot be about the logically impos-
sible.
 Impossibilism is the view that art does not have to be only about 
the logically possible, it can be about the logically impossible as 
well.
These two options are central claims of the views about the relation-
ship between art and the impossible. Of course, they can be combined 
with other related insights and give a richer theories. I would point 
out fi ve possible views about the issue. Notice: for the sake of brevity 
and style, in the rest of this article I will use “possible” primarily in 
the sense of “logically possible.” Though, I believe that arguments and 
insights that hold for the logically impossible mutatis mutandis can be 
applied to the factually impossible.
1) One can accept possibilism and try to explain away the counter-
examples. In this option, one has to show that that all the above 
mentioned examples are in fact possible.
2) One can accept possibilism and try to show that counterexam-
ples are not really counterexamples but rather misdescriptions 
of possible situations. Since impossible cannot be represented, 
the impression of the impossibility must be a verbal matter or a 
matter of interpretation.
3) One can accept possibilism and argue that impossible situations 
should be seen as auxiliary artistic means for saying something 
about the possible. On this view, impossibilities could have their 
role in the art although the art would ultimately be about the 
possible.
4) One can weaken the requirement of possibilism and argue that 
the above mentioned examples, although impossible, are imagin-
able or prima facie conceivable. In this option, one has to argue 
that the subject matter of the art has to be imaginable or prima 
facie conceivable, although it does not have to be really possible.13
12 In contemporary philosophical literature term possibilism denotes the view 
that all possible worlds are equally real, and it is opposed to actualism—the view 
that only the actual world is real. In spite of this terminological overlap, I have 
chosen this term because it perfectly expresses the idea.
13 David Chalmers distinction between prima facie and ideal conceivability can 
be useful here: “S is prima facie conceivable for a subject when S is conceivable for 
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5) One can accept impossibilism and try to show that art can be 
about the possible just as it can be about the impossible. On this 
view, some states of affairs are possible, some are not, and art 
can be about both. Art can represent impossible situations.
Some of these views are compatible and can be combined into a single 
theory. 1) and 2) are compatible: some counterexamples to the possibil-
ism can be explained away as in fact possible, and some as descriptions 
of something else. 3) is a certain concession to the impossibilism, al-
though it is still in the general spirit of the possibilism: impossibilities 
are seen only as auxiliary artistic means. Although 4) is basically an 
impossibilist view, there is still a strong air of possibilism in it: al-
though represented situation does not have to be possible, it has to be 
presented to us as possible and we have to experience it as possible. 5) 
is impossibilism in its simple and pure form.
The aim here is to provide (i) a single account that would hold for 
the whole of the art. Say, that 1) holds for all of the art. Though, the 
analysis might show that (ii) different accounts hold for different arts. 
Say, that 5) holds for the literature while 4) holds for the cinema and 
the theatre. Finally, it might turn out that (iii) there is no systematic 
account at all, and that relevant cases have to be analyzed one by one. 
As far as it goes, we will assume that there is a single account that 
holds for the whole of the art. If it turns out that there is no such thing, 
then one should withdraw to the less ambitious position
7. Apparent and Real Content
The interesting feature of the option 3) is that it relies on the assump-
tion that work of art has the apparent and the real content.1415 There 
that subject on fi rst appearances. … S is ideally conceivable when S is conceivable 
on ideal rational refl ection” (Chalmers 2002: 147). He also mentions van Cleve’s 
distinction between strong and weak conceivability: “According to van Cleve, S is 
strongly conceivable for a subject when the subject sees that S is possible; and S is 
weakly conceivable when the subject does not see that S is impossible” (Chalmers 
2002: 156).
14 Sometimes it can be hard to tell what is work really about. A good example 
is Henry James’ novella The Turn of the Screw from 1898. According to the 
supernaturalistic interpretation it is about the ghosts. According to the naturalistic 
interpretation it is about the main character’s hallucinations. It is not clear which 
interpretation is right.
15 Takashi Yagisawa believes that distinction between semantics and pragmatics 
might be useful here. Apparent content—actual meanings of words author uses 
would be semantics of the work, while real content—what author wanted to say 
would be pragmatics of the work. According to this view, to say that the leopard 
from the Hemingway’s Snows of Kilimanjaro stands for human strivings or to say 
that characters from Bulgakov’ The Master and Margarita stand for typical actual 
characters from the Soviet society in 1930’s, is to do pragmatic analysis. Such 
approach might be appropriate and fruitful. Though personally I would rather 
link pragmatics to something more immediate and noninferential in the concrete 
circumstances of the utterance.
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is a sense in which this assumption seems to be perfectly acceptable. 
Nobody thinks that Aesop’s fables and Kafka’s Metamorphosis are about 
zoology. Though, in some cases, this assumption might seem to be to in-
terpretative. In Terminator fi ght between humans and machines would 
belong to its real content because it is possible, while time travel would 
belong to its apparent content because it is not possible. However, one 
might object that the time travel in Terminator is not an auxiliary means 
for achieving an additional artistic or commercial effect, but rather the 
constitutive part of the plot. Oxymoron is usually an auxiliary literary 
device and author who is using it is not ontologically committed to the 
existence of the corresponding impossible objects. However, it is not 
clear how authors whose central theme is time travel could eliminate 
time travel from the ontology of their works. If they write about the time 
travel then they write about the time travel. In the novel and the fi lm 
The Time Traveler’s Wife random time travels of the main character 
determine the plot structure. They are constitutive for the work. Never-
theless, one might argue that we understand the plot by analogy with 
the actual people who, due to the nature of their jobs, do not spend time 
with their families. Sailors, soldiers, construction workers, travelling 
salesmen, prisoners, emigrants, … they are all absent from their homes 
for months. We understand what time traveler’s wife goes through by 
analogy with what wives of these people go through. One could replace 
random time traveler with the CIA agent who in the middle of the night 
receives a phone call and suddenly has to leave on an undetermined pe-
riod of time. The plot structure would basically remain the same. Time 
travel is just an additional spice to the story. The same holds for the 
Terminator. It does not matter whether assassins come from different 
time or from different town. Plot structure remains the same.16 At this 
place, one can accept 2) and argue that random time travel is just a mis-
description of usual father’s absence. Or, one can accept 3) and argue 
that time travel is a legitimate artistic auxiliary means which belongs 
to the apparent content and therefore has no importance in the ontologi-
cal analysis of the fi lm. These two claims are very close and the differ-
ence might even be purely verbal in the end. If we cannot understand 
an impossible situation, the question is what is really going on when we 
seemingly understand it. According to 2), since we cannot understand 
an impossible situation, we understand something else—some similar 
but possible situation. According to 3) we understand an impossible sit-
uation in the sense that it tells us something about the possible.
All in all, the consequence of 3) is that the requirement that fi ction-
al character and plots could have existed does not apply to the apparent 
content of work of art, but only to the real content.
16 Perhaps The Time Traveler’s Wife and Terminator can be plausibly explained 
away, but in some cases time travel seems really constitutive for the plot: BBC TV 
series Doctor Who, or Zemeckis’ trilogy Back to the Future, not to mention H.G. Wells’ 
novella The Time Machine. Nevertheless, if time travel is not logically possible, they 
have to be about something ese.
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 A fi ctional character or plot has to be possible only if it belongs 
to the real content of the work of art.
For this reason the claim does not apply to Aesop’s talking fox and Kaf-
ka’s transforming man. They could not have existed but this does not 
matter because they are only auxiliary artistic means for saying some-
thing else and do not belong to the real content of the work. Cartoon 
Madagascar is not about the animals. It is about the people. This is the 
way to preserve possibilism about the art on the one hand, and combi-
natorial or some other realistic theory of possibility on the other hand. 
This way may be demanding and hardworking because it requires deep 
and detailed analysis of works of art, but for the same reason it may 
be fruitful and rewarding because it will deepen our understanding of 
the works of art.
8. Art and the Impossible
8.1. Can Jean-Luc Picard fi ght himself?
In science fi ction TV series Star Trek: The Next Generation captain of 
the USS Enterprise Jean-Luc Picard often encounters himself. He en-
counters his past and future selves, or his possible selves.17 Given his 
strong-willed character, these encounters can end in a fi ght. The ques-
tion is what are we watching when we are watching such scenes. Op-
tions 1) and 4) do not have much chance because we can clearly see 
two men on the screen, and the assumption is that there is only one. 
The contradiction is obvious, and the situation cannot be possible, nor 
prima facie conceivable. Though, we are given some explanation of the 
situation: “due to the fl uctuations in the force fi eld, blah, blah, blah.” So 
we might have the impression that the situation is possible. But since 
the end result is a contradiction, processes that bring it about cannot 
be possible.18 It seems that in such situations 2) might have a chance. 
A scene on the screen can be described as a scene in which Jean-Luc 
Picard from time t1 fi ghts Jean-Luc Picard from t2, or a scene in which 
Jean-Luc Picard from world w0 fi ghts Jean-Luc Picard from w5. But that 
must be a misdescription of what we really see on the screen. What we 
17 Conceptual artist Dalibor Martinis interviewed his future self. He recorded 
the questions in 1978 and gave the answers in 2010 (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qWeVIcLE0Kg). Perhaps this interview can be verbally described in a 
paradoxical manner, as a conversation between earlier and later self, but that would 
be a misdescription of what was really going on.
18 A proponent of 1) could rely on four-dimensionalist ontology and argue that 
what we have at the screen are two temporal slices of Picard. Since temporal slices 
have existence of their own, independently of the temporal wholes to which they 
belong, it is in principle possible that they encounter. Four-dimensionalism is an 
overall better background ontology for the time travel cases because it stipulates 
that past, present, and future are equally real. It suits well for the time travel cases 
but not for the travel between different possible worlds, which is considered as 
impossible. Although four-dimensionalism is very popular view these days, I will 
not discuss it here.
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really see on the screen are two guys that look exactly the same and 
fi ght each other, not one and the same guy fi ghting himself. Both guys 
are in the same time and in the same possible world. It is not one and 
the same guy from different times and different possible worlds. How-
ever, the problem with this option is that it does not take into account 
the initial assumption that two men on the screen are supposed to be 
one and the same man. For this reason it cannot be taken as a good 
reconstruction of what we see at the screen. According to 3) situation on 
the screen might show the differences in values and aims of the younger 
and the older Picard. Younger one would take an adventurous course of 
action, while the older one would be more cautious. Since they are both 
stubborn, they fi ght. So, although the situation on the screen is impos-
sible, it represents something that is possible. The fi ght on the screen is 
in fact an inner fi ght. However, the problem with this interpretation is 
that the fi ght is not inner. These episodes are not about Picard’s dilem-
mas or inner struggles. They are about objectively existing people and 
their actions, in the fi ction of course. 5) might seem like the most prom-
ising option here. What we have on the screen is an impossible situation 
but it does not matter. We watch it, we enjoy it. Who cares whether it is 
possible or not. This position might seem like an easy way out but what 
counts against it is its overall implausibility. How can we watch some-
thing that is not possible? Can we watch a round square?
However, if we take a look at the plots of such episodes, we will see 
that they are usually about the attempts to take over command over the 
ship. As far as the plot is concerned, it does not really matter who tries 
to take over the ship. Is it a Star Fleet colleague, a younger offi cer, a 
pirate, a member of unknown species, … or Picard himself (younger, 
older, or possible). What really matters is that somebody tries to take 
over the ship and that (our) Picard fi ghts against it. The fact that the 
one who tries to take over the ship is Picard himself (younger, older, 
or possible) is an extra ingredient that makes no real difference to the 
plot. This extra ingredient is dispensable and therefore does not belong 
to the real content of the episode, but only to its apparent content.
 If the assumption that A and B are identical can be given up 
without affecting the plot structure, then it does not belong to its 
real content.
This analysis is an instance of the option 3). Though, the real content 
is not Picard’s inner struggle but his willingness to keep command over 
the ship. This shows that we can be wrong in the analysis of the real 
content. In accordance with 3) we might conclude that Jean-Luc Picard 
fi ghting himself is an impossible situation which represents something 
possible—his determination to keep control over his ship.
In this context one more thing should be mentioned. The assump-
tion of the argument is that our Jean-Luc Picard from our time and our 
dimension is identical to the one who comes from other time or other 
dimension. However, this is not the impression that we have when we 
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watch it. As spectators we are emotionally attached to our Jean-Luc 
Picard, not to other guys who come from different times or dimensions. 
We regard them as copies, as aliens, not as men who are identical to the 
original. We want our guy to win and to throw them back to where they 
came from. Although two guys are supposed to be identical, our reac-
tive attitudes toward them are not the same. Perhaps the assumption 
of identity should be revised here.
8.2. Can Anna Karenina 
throw and not throw herself under the train?
Say that there is a novel in which Anna Karenina does and does not 
throw herself under the train. In Chapter 8 she comes to the railroad 
station and throws herself under the train. In Chapter 9 she comes to 
the railroad station, changes her mind, and goes away. On its face value 
this is a direct contradiction and no account of possibility can render it 
possible, no matter how liberal the account is. Contradiction is so obvi-
ous that it cannot be prima facie conceivable. So, options 1) and 4) drop 
off. It is not clear how this could be a misdescription of something else. 
Since this is a novel, there can be no discrepancy between the text and 
the visual content. Inconsistency is so obvious that it is not possible 
that the author overlooked it or that he misexpressed himself. So, 2) 
drops off as well. It might seem that the proponent of 5) has his chance 
here. He might argue that the novel is about a woman who did and 
did not throw herself under the train. But since such a woman cannot 
exist, how could a novel be about her? There can be no her here. Since 
no women can satisfy both descriptions, a novel must be about nobody. 
Impossibilist would accept that she is not possible, but would argue that 
nevertheless the novel is about her—a woman who cannot exist. Gener-
ally, the impossibilist believes that there are impossible objects. They 
cannot exist but we can think and talk about them. So, the novel is 
about a woman who at the same time does and does not throw herself 
under the train. Possibilist would argue that necessarily non-existent 
subject matter cannot be a subject matter at all. Therefore, such a novel 
is either about nothing or about something else. Since it cannot be about 
nothing it has to be about something else! Do we have a metaphilosophi-
cal stalemate here? Possibilist and impossibilist would insist on their 
claims and accuse each other of begging the question. P: She cannot 
exist and the book cannot be about her. I: She cannot exist and the book 
is about her! … Although a situation might seem symmetrical here, I 
think we should reject impossibilism on the grounds of its overall im-
plausibility. So, the only option left is 3) and it seems that it fi ts the 
bill. According to this option, a novel is not about contradictory state 
of affairs, it is about something else. Perhaps author wants to express 
her dilemma—to live or not to live. Perhaps author wants to emphasize 
the fact that one always has a choice. Maybe author wanted to describe 
forking paths of her life—possible courses of action that she could have 
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taken. One might argue that the novel expresses many world hypoth-
esis or some other recent insight of quantum mechanics, but I would not 
go that far. Anyway, the point is that an impossible situation is used as 
artistic means for saying something about the actual or the possible.
We mentioned author’s intentions here. Impossibilist might argue 
that if author’s intention was to describe something impossible, we have 
to admit that the work of art is about something impossible. Since au-
thor’s intentions determine the content of the work, if the author wants 
to describe an impossible event, then his work describes an impossible 
event. However, even if the author wants to describe something impos-
sible, the question is whether he can be successfully in it. A writer can 
produce inconsistent text, that’s for sure. But the question is whether 
that text would stand for something. Is there anything that such a text 
would describe? No! So, even if the author’s intention really was to de-
scribe an impossible event, the text that he produces could not be a 
description of an impossible event. He can try, but he cannot do it. He 
would necessarily be unsuccessful. If somebody wants to draw a round 
square, good luck to him! In 2002 Roy Sorensen offered a 100$ prize “to 
the fi rst person who identifi es a picture of a logical impossibility.” (So-
rensen 2002: 337) To my knowledge the prize is still unclaimed.
8.3. Can water fall in a circle?
One might say that works of Dutch graphic artist M. C. Escher repre-
sent impossible objects. On his lithographs Waterfall, Relativity, As-
cending and Descending, water fl ows uphill, people endlessly climb in 
a circle, gravity works in different directions, perspectives are messed 
up, etc. If his works really represent impossible objects, then art can be 
about the impossible and impossibilist wins this debate. So, the ques-
tion is whether his works really represent impossible objects.
It seems that strategy 1) cannot work in Escher’s case. The content 
of his graphics can hardly be explained away as possible, even under 
the assumption of maximally liberal criterion of possibility. Perhaps 
works of some similar authors might be explained away as logically 
possible. One might argue that it is logically possible that giant rock 
on Rene Magritte’s Castle in the Pyrenees just fl oats in the air, un-
supported by anything. This is certainly physically impossible, per-
haps metaphysically impossible, but logically possible. Since a world 
without the gravity is not contradictory, Castle in the Pyrenees is logi-
cally possible. We can imagine it, we can conceive it. However, in the 
Escher’s case things seem to be different. The content of his graphics 
can be described as contradictory: water that fl oats in a circle creates a 
waterfall, it fl oats upward and downward at the same time, people that 
climb up the stairs do not climb up the stairs, etc. These descriptions 
are logically contradictory, and they cannot be explained away by ap-
peal to liberal criterion of possibility.19
19 It is very interesting question whether pictures are discursive. Sorensen says: 
“I agree with most philosophers in denying that pictures are discursive” (Sorensen 
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Does it mean that Escher was successful in drawing or represent-
ing impossible objects? Such a conclusion would be very hard to accept 
because graphics is visual and we cannot visualize impossible objects.
If drawing X demonstrates the possibility of X, then we appear to have a 
quick proof that it is impossible to draw an impossible object. Drawing an 
impossible object would show that it is possible for an impossible thing to 
exist. Contradiction. Therefore, it is impossible to draw an impossible ob-
ject. (Sorensen 2002: 343)
In accordance with 2) one might argue that these contradictory de-
scriptions are in fact misdescriptions of something else. Since graphics 
as physical objects cannot be contradictory, the seat of contradictions 
must be in our interpretation, not in objects themselves. There cannot 
be anything contradictory in the inked and non-inked areas of the li-
thography. However, the problem with this line of reasoning is that we 
do not discuss Escher’s graphics as physical objects, we discuss their 
content, we discuss what they represent. The question is whether they 
represent something contradictory, not whether they as physical ob-
jects are something contradictory.
A natural thing to say is that Escher’s graphics do not represent 
impossible objects but rather create illusions of impossible objects. This 
amounts to saying that these works only seem to represent impossible 
objects but in fact they do not. But, if these works do not represent im-
possible objects, what do they represent? What are they really about? 
It is not suffi cient to say that they are about something else, we have to 
say what are they about. There are several answers possibilist might 
give here. (1) One might argue that Waterfall represents waterfall, that 
Ascending and Descending represent monks walking up and down the 
stairs, etc. Here one would simply ignore the perspectival inconsisten-
cies and say what is the object that graphics represent. In the same 
way in which we ignore minor ungrammaticalities in the language. Of 
course, perspectival inconsistencies and paradoxicality was Escher’s 
point and we cannot ignore it. (2) One might say that Escher’s graphics 
are about possible elements composed in a wrong way. Though, it is not 
clear whether possibilist is allowed to give such answer. If the wrong 
way means the way that brings about impossible objects, possibilist 
cannot give such answer. If the wrong way means that author uses 
more than one perspective instead of only one, this path seems to be 
open to the possibilist. This path would lead us to the complete and de-
tailed description of the graphics without any mention of inconsistency 
and paradoxicality. But again, such a description would miss author’s 
intention. (3) One can argue that Escher’s graphics are really about 
the role of perspective in the perception. For they show what happens 
if the rules of perspective are not obeyed. Perceptual illusions are fun 
and they can be used for amusement only. But their real purpose is 
2002: 341). However, the claim here is weaker. The claim is not that pictures are 
discursive in their nature, but that their content can be described with sentences.
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to reveal the mechanisms of our perception: if we see where things go 
wrong, we can guess how the underlying mechanisms work when ev-
erything is right. And this is the true role of illusions in the psychology 
of perception. In the same way, the true role of Escher’s graphics is to 
make us aware of the role and nature of perspective in the perception. 
This is what Escher’s graphics are really about. There is certainly some 
truth in this insight but what remains to be seen is whether Escher’s 
graphics do so by representing impossible objects. (4) A similar answer 
would be to claim that Escher’s graphics represent Penrose’s stairs and 
Penrose’s triangle. This is what they are really about. In the Waterfall 
there are three Penrose’s triangles one above the other. This is obvi-
ously true but, again, the question that is relevant in this discussion is 
whether Penrose’s stairs and Penrose’s triangle are impossible objects. 
A proponent of 3) would allow that. He would argue that Penrose’s 
stairs and Penrose’s triangle are impossible objects that serve as artis-
tic means for saying something about the actual. But here we are still 
dealing with 2), which is purely possibilist option. (5) One can argue 
that Escher’s graphics express ideas. Relativity represents relativity—
the idea that things can be seen from more than one perspective. In this 
sense, Kurosawa’s Rashomon and Escher’s Relativity express the same 
idea. Escher himself took Ascending and Descending to express life—
endless motion in a closed circle. One might see Ascending and De-
scending as representing Wheel of Fortune or Rota Fortunae. Though, 
since there are no desired or undesired objects in a circle, it should 
rather be taken to depict existential meaninglessness. (6) Finally, one 
might argue that graphics do not represent anything. There are two 
independent reasons for saying this. First, since objects that graph-
ics purport to represent necessarily cannot exist, graphics represent 
nothing. Second, objects should be drawn from a single perspective. If 
they are not, they cannot represent anything. Just like ungrammatical 
sentences say nothing, graphics drawn from more than one perspec-
tive represent nothing. In spite of its philosophical elegance, this view 
is hard to defend. How can we say that they represent nothing when 
obviously there is something on them? We can recognize some forms 
and shapes. It is something, it cannot be nothing. Anyway, a proponent 
of 2) has to argue in favor of some of these, or some similar answers. 
Since he claims that Escher’s graphics cannot be about the impossible 
objects, he has to say what are they really about.
A question that is relevant here is what does it mean that graph-
ics G represents object X. Representing can have two meanings here, 
transitive and intransitive. To say that G represents X in the transitive 
sense implies that outside of G and independently of G there exists an 
object X. To say that G represents X in the intransitive sense implies 
that X’s existence is within G, not independent of it. Nelson Goodman 
says that “the picture of” and “represents” can be understood as one 
place predicates and as two places predicates.
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What, for example, do pictures of Pickwick or of a unicorn represent? They 
do not represent anything; they are representations with null denotation. 
Yet how can we say that a picture represents Pickwick, or a unicorn, and 
also say that it does not represent anything. … Obviously a picture cannot, 
barring equivocation, both represent Pickwick and represent nothing. But a 
picture may be of a certain kind—be a Pickwick-picture or a man-picture—
without representing anything. (Goodman 1968: 21–22)
Escher’s graphics obviously cannot represent impossible objects in the 
transitive sense of represent, because these objects are not out there to 
be represented. The question is whether Escher’s graphics represent 
impossible objects in the intransitive sense of the word.
In the case of Escher’s graphics there is one more ambiguity to be 
clarifi ed. The question whether we can see the impossible objects on 
these graphics can be understood in two senses.
 1) We can see that such object are not possible.
 2) We can see impossible object.
Possibilist is satisfi ed with 1). By looking at the graphics we can see 
what the author purports to represent and we can see that such object 
cannot exist. Impossibilist needs sense 2). He has to claim that artist 
did succeed in representing an impossible object and that we can see 
it on the graphics. Now, the crucial question is whether we can see 
an impossible object on the graphics or not. On Escher’s graphics, ele-
ments are represented realistically but then combined in impossible 
ways. Parts are possible while wholes are not. In the top center of the 
Relativity there are two guys walking on the same stairs, in the same 
direction, but one climbs up the stairs while another one goes down 
the stairs. Each of these guys taken in itself is possible, but if they 
are taken together they are not possible. We can see one of them going 
down the stairs. We can see another one going up the stairs. But can we 
see both of them at once, going up and down the stairs at once? Impos-
sibilist should argue that we can see them both at the same time, while 
possibilist should argue that we cannot. For if we cannot see them, 
then graphics does not represent them. Talking about the Relativity 
Hofstadter says that we do see the impossible combinations.
So we are forced, by the hierarchical nature of our perceptive processes, to 
see either a crazy world or just a bunch of pointless lines. A similar analy-
sis could be made of dozens of Escher picture, which rely heavily upon the 
recognition of certain basic forms, which are put together in nonstandard 
ways; and by the time the observer sees the paradox on a high level, it is 
to late—he can’t go back and change his mind about how to interpret the 
lower-level objects. (Hofstadter 1979: 98)
However, it seems that Hofstadter goes wrong here. In the case of 
duck-rabbit and other Gestalt illusions we either see the duck or we see 
the rabbit. We cannot see both at the same time. Possibilist will argue 
that the same hold in the case of Relativity and other Escher’s graphics. 
We either see a man going down the stairs or we see a man going up the 
stairs. We cannot see both of them in the same time. Therefore, we can-
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not see an impossible situation. And if we cannot see it, the graphics 
cannot represent it. Seeing includes subconscious inferential process-
ing and, although pictures of both men are refl ected on our retinas, 
we cannot form a single picture of both of them. This is not a matter 
of contingent limitation of our perceptual apparatus, it is a matter of 
necessity. For, to see X as a single object just is to see that its elements 
exist together. And if we cannot see that its elements exist together, we 
cannot see it at all. In one moment we see one element of the purported 
impossible object, in another moment we see the other element, but 
there is no moment in which we clearly see the impossible object. We 
can sum up this insight in the following principle.
 If we can see that X is impossible, then we cannot see X.
This may sound like a contradiction, so here we have to clarify the 
sense in which we can see that something is impossible. When we say 
that we can see the elements, we talk about seeing in the direct and 
perceptual sense. However, when we say that we can see that elements 
cannot coexist, we talk in the indirect, intellectual or inferential sense 
of seeing. Strictly speaking, the impossibility of coexistence of the ele-
ments is not something that we can literally see, but rather something 
that we infer. Since this inferential process is mainly subconscious and 
perception related, we can say that we can see that elements cannot 
coexist, but this is seeing in its secondary and derivative sense.
This analysis shows that impossibilist does not have a case with 
Escher’s graphics. Escher certainly created very interesting and nice 
puzzles, but he did not represent impossible objects. We can say that he 
was very good in trying to draw impossible objects, but not in actually 
drawing them. He did get as close as possible to representing impos-
sible objects, but he did not really represent them. So, in the case of 
Escher’s graphics the most promising option seems to be 2).
8.4. Can we kill our own grandfathers?
The paradox of patricide is standard a priori argument against the pos-
sibility of time travel. It is an reductio argument: if it was possible to 
travel in time, then it would be possible to travel back in time and 
kill one’s own grandfather before he conceived one’s own father. But 
this is absurd: if one kills one’s own grandfather before he conceived 
one’s own father, one could not exist and therefore one could not kill 
anybody. Since this consequence is absurd, time travel is impossible, 
so runs the argument. Nevertheless, we can easily imagine a novel or 
a fi lm with exactly such a plot. Guy fi nds out that his grandfather was 
very abusive man who was heavily beating grandmother during years 
of their marriage. Our guy gets very angry on his grandfather and, 
since time travel is technologically possible, decides to prevent past 
grandmother’s suffering. He gets a gun, jumps back in time before his 
grandfather met his grandmother, fi nds his grandfather and kills him. 
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After that he gets back into the present and normally continues his life. 
Everything is the same as it was, only his grandmother sometimes has 
unexplainable feeling of gratitude toward him.
Impossibilist 5) would argue that this case clearly shows that art 
can be about the impossible. Plot is impossible but nevertheless we 
can watch the movie, approve or disapprove of the protagonist’s deci-
sion, feel the suspense and the relief, etc. What difference does it make 
whether the plot is possible or not? This is an impossible situation and 
the fi lm represents it. It is about an impossible course of events!
At this place possibilist might argue that the fi lm represents ele-
ments that are by themselves possible: it is possible that one feels sorry 
for one’s grandmother, it is possible that one kills an abusive man, etc. 
The fi lm is about these elements, not about the impossible way in which 
these elements are supposed to be combined. According to this view – 2), 
to say that the fi lm is about the paradox of patricide would be to misde-
scribe the real content of the fi lm. The fi lm is about the guy who kills an 
abusive man, not about the guy who kills his own abusive grandfather 
before he met grandmother. Of course, impossibilist 5) would protest 
here and argue that we should not reinterpret the content of the fi lm. If 
the screen writer says that guy kills his own grandfather, if the director 
says that guy kills his own grandfather, if the narrator in the fi lm says 
that guy kills his own grandfather, … then guy kills his own grandfa-
ther. A philosopher should not patronize all these people and tell them 
what they really said. They said what they said! However, it seems that 
possibilist 2) has a strong point here: if X is impossible, one cannot rep-
resent it. Just as painter cannot represent a round square, writer or 
movie maker cannot represent a paradox of patricide. What they really 
represented has to be something else. They can think that they repre-
sented a paradox, they can say it, but they cannot do it. Just like Escher 
in his graphics, they can represent elements of an impossible situation 
but they cannot represent an impossible situation.
Possibilist may take course 1) and try to show that the paradox of 
patricide is not really a paradox. One might claim that the universe 
contains some sort of buffering mechanisms that would fi x the distur-
bances we may cause when we travel in time, or something like that. 
But, if it is a matter of necessity that we have parents that we have, it 
is not clear what these mechanisms should do. With different grandfa-
thers our parents would not be our parents and we would not be we. So, 
option 1) does not seem promising in this case.
4) might seem promising here. One might argue that the content of 
the fi lm prima facie seems consistent: when we watch the fi lm and en-
joy it, we simply do not think about its paradoxical consequences. Plot 
of the fi lm seems consistent to us although it is not. We only think that 
we watch a guy who kills his own abusive grandfather, but we do not. 
What we really watch is something similar—a guy who kills an abusive 
man, not a guy who kills his own abusive grandfather. But if this is so, 
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then the fi lm cannot be about a guy who kills his own abusive grand-
father. It cannot represent such a guy. And this shows that position 4) 
cannot stand on its own and that it falls back into the possibilism.
One might take stance 3) and argue that in this case the paradox 
of patricide is just a means for saying something else. Perhaps for say-
ing that we cannot wash away shame for the sins of our ancestors, 
that there exists tragic guilt, moral luck, original sin, or something like 
that. One might argue that the very impossibility of the plot shows that 
our protagonist will forever remain the grandson of a molester and that 
there is nothing he can do to change it. The message of the fi lm would 
be that we have to live with the sins of our fathers! Of course, whether 
this is the message of the fi lm would signifi cantly depend upon the 
intentions of the author. So, the paradox of patricide can be only an 
additional spice to the otherwise consistent story of killing a molester, 
or it can be a means for saying something important about the human 
condition. That will depend upon the intentions of the author and the 
reception of the audience.
The interesting question here is whether 2) and 3) are compatible or 
not. If author cannot represent an impossible situation, how can he use 
it to say something about the possible? He can use it only if he can rep-
resent it. Does it mean that 3) is an essentially impossibilistic option? 
Appeal to the distinction between apparent and real content can be of 
no use here. Even if an impossible situation belongs to the apparent 
content, it is still not clear how can author use it if he cannot represent 
it? However, possibilist might try to argue that author can use an im-
possible situation without representing it. In that case the claim would 
be that author represents elements of an impossible situation, not an 
impossible situation itself, and that we infer that certain combination 
of elements is impossible. Speaking in Wittgensteinian way, one might 
say that in such cases author indicates an impossible situation without 
representing it. Here we have a difference between (1) showing that 
an object is not possible and (2) showing an impossible object. (1) is 
compatible with possibilism while (2) is not. The point is that (1) is suf-
fi cient for the analysis of a fi lm or a novel with such content.
To sum up this paragraph, it seems that a work of art that is prima 
facie about the paradox of patricide cannot really be about it. Hence, it 
cannot support impossibilism – option 5). Possibilism, options 2) and/or 
3), provide better reconstruction of such novel or fi lm.
9. Can we individuate 
different impossible states of affaires?
If inconsistent stories do not represent anything, then we cannot indi-
viduate them according to their content because they all have the same 
content—nothing. However, on the other hand, it seems that different 
inconsistent stories do have different contents and that we can individ-
uate them. A novel about Anna Karenina who does and does not throw 
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herself under the train, and a novel about Captain Ahab who does and 
does not catch Moby Dick, although both inconsistent, have different 
contents. The fi rst one is about Anna Karenina and her suicide, and the 
second one is about Captain Ahab’s catching a big white whale. Story 
about a guy who travels back in time and kills his grandfather before 
he met grandmother is about a guy who travels back in time and kills 
his grandfather, and so on. Prima facie, these stories obviously have 
different contents and we can individuate them. Impossibilist might try 
to build his case here. He might try to argue that different stories are 
different stories, no matter whether they are about the possible courses 
of events or about the impossible ones. On the impossibilist’s view, the 
impossible stories are just as good as the possible ones. Therefore, art 
can be about the impossible too.
This view may have some prima facie plausibility but it is ultimate-
ly untenable. Inconsistent descriptions have no content and we cannot 
individuate them by their content. As we saw, impossible situations are 
composed of possible elements arranged in an impossible way.20 We in-
dividuate impossible situations by appeal to the possible elements they 
are composed of, not by appeal to different impossible situations they 
make part of. There are no different impossible situations. There are 
only different possible elements that we can try to arrange in an impos-
sible way, try but not succeed. We can individuate Anna Karenina that 
throws herself under the train, we can individuate Anna Karenina that 
does not throw herself under the train, but we cannot individuate Anna 
Karenina that does and does not throw herself under the train. Such 
Anna cannot exist and we cannot think and talk about her. Talk about 
such Anna cannot be about her because there is no and there can be no 
her. It cannot be about anything. The following might sound strange 
but it is so. Say that Anna Karenina is written in two volumes. In vol-
ume one she throws herself under the train and in volume two she does 
not. In this case volume one would have content, volume two would 
have content, but both volumes taken together would have no content 
at all. Impossibilist might protest here: How could that be? How could 
parts be meaningful and whole meaningless? The answer is simple. If 
volume two negates what volume one says, then both volumes taken to-
gether just say nothing. For this reason we cannot individuate different 
impossible situations.21 Can we tell apart Anna who does and does not 
throw herself under the train from Anna who does and does not marry 
Vronsky?22 Well, loosely speaking, we might say that the fi rst one is 
20 Raymond Smullyan asks: “What happens if an irresistible cannonball hits an 
immovable post?” A contradiction happens! An irresistible cannonball can exist, an 
immovable post can exist, but they cannot both exist at the same time (Smullyan 
1978: 8).
21 In other words, there cannot be different impossible worlds. In a charitable 
interpretation we could individuate them, but only by appeal to their possible 
ingredients, not by appeal to their impossible composition.
22 Quine was worried that we cannot individuate possible objects (Quine, 1948). 
Perhaps so, but we certainly cannot individuate impossible ones.
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about suicide while the second one is about marriage. Corresponding 
novels would contain some textual difference and we could individuate 
different texts. However, strictly speaking, these two novels would not 
be about different characters, they would not be about characters at 
all. Therefore, impossibilist cannot build his case on these grounds. Art 
cannot be about the impossible. It has to be about the possible.
10. Conclusion
I hope that I have successfully shown that art is not and cannot be 
about the logically impossible. Since art is typically about something, 
and logically impossible is nothing, works of art that are prima facie 
about the logically impossible have to really be about something else. 
People who claim that art is and can be about the logically impossible 
are going too far. Art cannot depict logically impossible events, plots, 
objects, or worlds because they are necessarily nonexistent and nothing 
can depict them. Though, logically impossible can be used as auxiliary 
means that points to something possible.
References
Alber, J. 2016. Unnatural Narrative: Impossible Worlds in Fiction and 
Drama. University of Nebraska Press.
Aristotle 2015. Poetics. Translated by S. H. Butcher. Calgary: Scholar’s 
Choice.
Armstrong, D. M. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Chalmers, D. 2002. “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” In T. S. Gen-
dler and J. Hawthorne (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Goodman, N. 1968. Languages of Art. Indianapolis and New York: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company.
Hofstadter, D. R. 2000. Gödel, Escher, Bach: and Eternal Golden Braid. 
New York: Penguin Books.
Hume, D. 1985. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York: Penguin Classics.
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, K. D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Loux, M. (ed.). 1979. The Possible and the Actual. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity.
Mellor, D. H. 1998. Real Time II. New York: Routledge.
Mondadori, F. and Morton, A. 1979. “Modal Realism: The Poisoned Pawn.” 
Philosophical Review 85 (1): 3–20.
Parfi t, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford university Press.
Plantinga, A. 1978. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Priest, G. 1997. “Sylvan’s Box: a Short Story and Ten Morals,” Notre Dame 
Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4): 573–582.
Quine, W. V. O. 1953. “On What There Is.” In From a Logical Point of View. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
 B. Berčić, Art and the Impossible 177
Sider, T. 2009. “Time.” In S. Schneider (ed.). Science Fiction and Philoso-
phy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Smullyan, R. 1978. What is the Name of This Book? Hoboken: Prentice-
Hall.
Sorensen, R. 2002. “The Art of the Impossible.” In T. S. Gendler and J. 
Hawthorne (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Thomasson, A. 1999. Fiction and Metapysics. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.

